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Devolved government in Scotland actively re-constitutes the unequal 
conditions of social class reproduction. Recognition of state-led class re-
constitution draws upon the social theory of Pierre Bourdieu. Our analysis of 
social class in devolved Scotland revisits theories that examine the state as a 
‘power container’. A range of state enabling powers regulate the legal, 
economic, social and cultural containers of class relations as specific forms of 
what Bourdieu called economic, social and cultural ‘capital’. The preconditions 
of class reproduction are structured in direct ways by the Scottish state as a 
wealth container but also, more indirectly, as a cultural container and a social 
container. Competitive nationalism in the devolved Scottish state enacts 
neoliberal policies as a class-specific worldview but, at the same time, 
discursively frames society as a pan-class national fraternity in terms of 
distinctive Scottish values of welfare nationalism. Nationalism is able to 
express this ambiguity in symbolic ways in which the partisan language of 
social class cannot.  




Competitive Nationalism: State, Class and the Forms of Capital in 
Devolved Scotland  
Introduction 
In the UK the pattern of political support is becoming more territorially uneven. 
Devolution did not create political differentiation and segregation but, rather, 
expresses and entrenches it (Tijmstra, 2009: 738-739). While never a simple 
‘north-south’ divide, the geographical isolation of Conservative support is an 
increasingly pronounced feature of UK electoral politics, a process confirmed 
by the 2010 General Election (Dorling, 2010). Support for Conservatives 
increased wherever they were already strongly placed - the most affluent 
constituencies in England, above all, south east England. In contrast even 
affluent voters in Scotland rejected the electoral appeal of revived 
Conservativism, which has proven singularly incapable of recovering from the 
electoral disaster of 1997. Then the percentage vote for Conservatives was 
almost halved and they failed to win a single seat after 18 years of steadily 
declining representation (see Table 1). At the May 2011 Scottish elections, 
Conservatives failed to improve on their existing poor performance, with their 
share of the constituency vote declining further from 17% in 2007 to 13.9% 
(see Table 2). In a desperate gamble to arrest decline, Murdo Fraser, deputy 
Conservative leader at Holyrood recently proposed abolishing the Scottish 
Conservative and Unionist Party altogether and replacing it with a ‘less toxic 
brand’, threatening a damaging split in the leading party of UK co-government. 
 
While Conservatives are in political crisis and unable to command wide 
support in Scotland, Scottish nationalism exerts minority, if growing, political 
traction. At UK General Elections the Scottish National Party consistently poll 
 4 
around one in five voters but gained almost forty-five per cent of constituency 
votes for the Scottish Parliament in 2011, enabling them to form the first 
majority government since devolution was introduced in 1999 (Table 2). 
Nationalists anticipated ‘a Westminster breakthrough’ at the 2010 UK election 
as a prelude to forcing the pace of political independence. Instead, the Labour 
Party won two out of every five votes in Scotland, consolidating their position 
as the official opposition in Scotland to the Conservative-Liberal Democrat UK 
coalition government – at least at UK level.  
 
In making sense of these shifts we extend our gaze beyond the relatively 
narrow discussion of contrasting electoral fortunes. Electoral results reflect 
profound changes in Scottish society, requiring an understanding of the 
structuring, shaping and alteration of social relations, social class above all. 
However, in many of interpretations of devolution and Scottish society, the 
structuring effects of class relations are largely absent. For example, Tijmstra 
(2009) usefully explores how issues of legitimacy helped to fuel the rise of 
‘regionalist’ demands and a rising sense of Scottish national identity, but 
neglects to account for the part played by the restructuring of social classes in 
the dialectic of nation and state. In other accounts, Scotland’s peculiar political 
arithmetic seems to defy the electoral logic of a society seen by some to be 
possessed of a transformed, predominantly middle class, social structure 
(Paterson et al, 2004). A new, open and upwardly mobile social system in 
Scotland appears to strongly favour the symbolic trans-class appeal of the 
SNP: ‘The fluidity of the class system opens up further possibilities to a party 
without a historic class profile’ (Keating, 2009: 65).  
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Taken in its subjective form, class is often treated as an identity, 
interchangeable with other markers of difference such as ethnicity, age, 
community, gender or nation. In this form, class is reduced to data about 
attitudes to work and consumption. In its objective form it is equated with the 
market position of aggregated individuals. However, class is reproduced 
neither through the perfect competition of equal agents in markets nor as a 
voluntary identity. Following Bourdieu (2006), class is ‘accumulated history’. 
As such, class is an enduring condition that persists as a series of constraints 
through an ‘economy of practices’. Relative amounts of economic capital, 
holdings which can be directly converted into money, remain central to this 
conception of class, but only as a special case of more general processes of 
class formation through unequal exchange. Any totality of class practices 
must also include other forms of capital (cultural, social and symbolic), their 
distribution, volume and composition.  
 
Famously, Bourdieu (1984; 2006) calls these forms of class practices and 
resources cultural capital, social capital and symbolic capital. Variegated 
marketisation strategies enable the value of different capitals to be 
reconverted, say using social capital of elite networks to access economic 
capital through market advantage. Extra-economic forms of capital fail to be 
recognised as class domination as such. Indeed, the success of class 
reproduction depends precisely on the misrecognition of class interests as the 
disinterested practices and spontaneous attributes of national social agents. 
Each form of capital is both embodied in the durable dispositions of people 
and objectified in particular forms, for instance, in cultural goods like books or 
home furnishings. Importantly for our purposes, each form of capital also 
acquires an institutionalised state form set apart from the initial investment of 
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time and effort in the home and school. Initial investment in class reproduction 




In this paper we revisit state theory and Bourdieu’s approach to the social 
sources of state power to account for the active role of the devolved Scottish 
government in shaping the unequal conditions of class reproduction. Here the 
devolved state in Scotland functions as a power container filled by specific 
kinds of class content but where state legitimacy derives from a trans-class 
people-nation. Although the Scottish state lacks full sovereign power it 
nevertheless exercises considerable economic, cultural and symbolic power, 
with profound consequences for the reproduction of class relations. Each type 
of capital in Bourdieu’s sense corresponds to different state containers: 
economic capital to the wealth container; cultural capital to the cultural 
container; social capital to the social container; and symbolic capital to the 
power container. Territorial politics is filled with different, often contradictory, 
class content, not least in the appeal to values of social justice at the same 
time as enacting neoliberal policies in the service of global economic 
competitiveness (Law, 2005; Scott and Mooney, 2009; Mooney and Scott 
2012).  
 
The nationalisation of Scotland 
The conundrum of class, nation and territorial politics in Scotland requires 
closer examination. Nationalism is not a unified ‘thing-like’ substance. As 
philosophers of language claim, it is not the meaning of a word like ‘nation’ (or 
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‘class’ for that matter) that makes it useful but, rather, only in its use does the 
word become meaningful. While ‘nation’ has become increasingly meaningful 
in Scotland, ‘class’ has been rendered relatively meaning-less as political 
discourse. In social attitude surveys the more Scottish that people felt the less 
that they identified with non-Scots of a similar class. While a quarter of 
respondents in Scotland surveyed in 2006 identify with those from the same 
class but a different nationality more people, around half, identify with people 
of the same nationality from a different class, compared to only a third in 
England that place national identity before class identity (Bond, in Bechhofer 
and McCrone, 2009: 112).  
 
One explanation for the 2007 and 2011 election successes of the SNP is that 
devolution has shifted the focus of territorial politics more emphatically from 
class to nation as a collective ‘frame of reference’ (Bechhofer and McCrone, 
2009). Before the 1990s social class played a significant role in political 
beliefs and collective identity across Scotland and England since their socio-
economic structure was broadly similar (McCrone, 1992). Scotland’s tribal 
loyalty to Labour and visceral hostility to Conservatism, at least from the 
1960s, was typically explained as reflecting, first, the national egalitarian 
values of an ‘industrial nation’, and, later, the rapidly deteriorating conditions 
for the industrial working class in the 1970s and 1980s (see Table 3). Surplus 
labour expelled during Scotland’s crisis of manufacturing in the early 1980s 
was only haltingly, if at all, reabsorbed by service employment as an extended 
form of class reproduction. In the past two decades this has been replaced by 
an expansion of highly qualified professions, mainly in public services and 
financial services (Paterson et al, 2004). Today the traditional classes on 
which political support depended – landowners, industrial bourgeoisie and 
organised labour – have undergone radical transformation, losing the social 
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weight to shape electoral preferences (Keating, 2009). There is no longer a 
cohesive ruling class of the kind that once delivered the votes of skilled and 
unskilled Protestant workers for the Conservative Party, who remained the 
dominant force even in industrial Glasgow until the mid-1950s. At the same 
time organised labour is increasingly confined to the public sector, now 
experiencing severe contraction following decades of growth and expansion. 
With the general growth of public sector employment in Scotland until 
recently, a new interest coalition was constructed as a potential electoral bloc 
over which New Labour and the SNP contend fiercely.  
 
Much has been made in this account of the legacy of administrative meso-
level autonomy of the Scottish sub-state around the Scottish Office and the 
distinctive institutions of Scottish civil society, principally law, religion, and 
education as reproducing a distinctive national fraternity (Paterson, 1994). 
Here, British identity was limited to a pragmatic ‘state-nation identity’, 
attributed historically to an internal British market for goods and services, the 
British empire and British militarism, a shared Protestant religion and, since 
the 1940s, a British welfare state (Morton, 1999). Scots thought of themselves 
as equal partners in the Union, a condition which produced a dual sense of 
national identity, Scottish and British (Davidson, 2000). As the ‘banal 
nationalism’ (Billig, 1995) of Britishness as a state-defined way of life began to 
lose its lustre in Scotland with the impact of relative industrial decline and 
conflict in the 1970s and 1980s, the unitary British state appeared to be too 
small to cope with globalisation but too large to deal with the demands of its 
constituent national populations (Philips, 2008).  
 
State authority depends on a special claim of competence to transform the 
arbitrary arrangements of its own power into something necessary and 
essential:  
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… powers based on (physical or economic) force can only obtain their 
legitimation through powers that cannot be suspected of obeying force; 
and that the legitimating efficacy of an act of recognition (homage, a 
mark of deference, a token of respect) varies with the degree of 
independence of the agent or institution that grants it (and also with the 
recognition that he or it enjoys). (Bourdieu, 2000: 104) 
The state imposes the symbolic apparatus through which it is itself to be 
perceived, above all as the embodiment of the nation. ‘Through the structuring 
it imposes on practices, the State institutes and inculcates common symbolic 
forms of thought, social frames of perception, understanding or memory, State 
forms of classification or, more precisely, practical schemes of perception, 
appreciation and action’ (Bourdieu, 2000: 175). Hence state legitimacy does 
not depend mainly on propaganda or self-conscious collective deliberation. 
Outside of an exceptional crisis, legitimacy is generated routinely through the 
nationalising dispositions inscribed in things, institutions and bodies. Symbolic 
power rests on the everyday appeal of nationalism, concealing conflicting 
social interests behind the disinterest of national unity (Billig, 1995).  
 
Welfare Nationalism and Competitive Nationalism 
While there has been a marked consolidation of Scottish national identity 
alongside growing electoral support for the SNP, this does not necessarily 
translate into guaranteed support for full independence for Scotland, as voter 
surveys suggest (Dinwoodie, 2011; MacLeod and Davidson, 2011). Here the 
policy content of the relationship between class, nation and state requires 
more precise modelling. First, ‘welfare nationalism’ generates support for 
devolution, it is claimed, because the Scottish state is smaller, more 
responsive and accountable, and can experiment with the various policy 
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instruments under its control to reduce class inequalities (McEwen, 2002). 
However, operating against the amelioration of class inequalities in the overall 
interest of the nation stands the fact that the main instruments of 
redistribution, taxation and social security, remain centralised ‘reserved 
matters’ not devolved powers (see Figure 1). 
Figure 1 
Second, ‘competitive nationalism’, in contrast, mobilises the resources of the 
devolved Scottish state within a neoliberal political economy. As the national 
economic strategy indicates, to attract mobile global investment and secure 
the accumulation of indigenous capital, competitive nationalism offers various 
capital-friendly incentives, including lower relative wage costs, flexible labour 
supply and infrastructural requirements through higher public spending 
(Graefe, 2005). Here class inequalities are likely to worsen since redistribution 
pushes in the opposite, regressive direction towards private capital. In the 
long run, competitive nationalism projects that private capital will raise the 
absolute standard of living even if wealth and income distribution become 
grossly unequal within and across regions, a process identified in Southern 
Italy some time ago by Stuart Holland (1976). A third position holds that 
devolution has made little difference to the class-state-nation nexus since 
constitutional change in a peripheral sub-state is unlikely to affect the global 
structures of capital accumulation. This perspective has little to commend it. 
Scotland has some of the widest powers of any devolved state (Keating, 
2010). While it has little direct control over redistribution, considerable policy 
discretion is exercised over the competing priorities of social justice and 
capital accumulation (Figure 1).  
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Class reproduction is bisected by the vectors of competitive nationalism and 
welfare nationalism. Devolved policy in Scotland combines unevenly with 
reserved policy to actively structure class relations, albeit in contradictory 
ways. Competitive nationalism envisions the devolved state as an enabler for 
capital accumulation; welfare nationalism envisions the devolved state as an 
enabler of social justice (Law, 2005). Successive devolved governments in 
Scotland have used their powers to affect a number of original policy 
developments, some tending towards welfare nationalism and others to 
competitive nationalism. The former includes free personal care for the elderly 
and land reform, while the latter is apparent in neoliberal programmes for 
public services, urban regeneration and successive economic strategy 
documents (cf. Andrews and Martin, 2010; Burchardt and Holder, 2009).  
 
Competitive nationalism and welfare nationalism are rarely identified as 
specific types of class project. This neglect of the class structuring effects of 
state power excessively restricts analyses of territorial politics. Both are 
nation-building projects. Both advance an image of Scottishness, of authentic 
Scottish values and interests beyond narrow class interests and ideologies. 
As a key part of its nation-building endeavours, SNP social imagery pictures 
Scotland as a vibrant, competitive North Atlantic society, a ‘new’ Scotland in 
the making, transforming the dominant labourist image of Scottishness in the 
process. This important and all too frequently over-looked shift crucially entails 
an ideological assault on the remaining vestiges of an unnamed, yet 
simultaneously widely understood ‘problematic’ working class culture and way 
of life resistant to behavioural reform and the entrepreneurial spirit (Gray and 
Mooney, 2011).  
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Class relations are actively recomposed in Scotland through a state-imposed 
vision of the competitive nation, though Scotland is not unique in this respect 
(Graefe, 2005). Shortly after it assumed governmental power, the SNP 
mobilised the symbolic power of a single unified national ‘Purpose’ in The 
Government Economic Strategy (Scottish Government, 2007), reinforced by 
the second SNP Government’s Economic Strategy:  
 
Scotland has real strength in the most vital factor for modern 
economies - the human capital offered by our greatest asset, 
Scotland's people. We need to build on this strength and, importantly, 
make more of it in broadening Scotland's comparative advantage in the 
global economy. (First Minister, Executive Summary, Scottish 
Government, 2011)  
In these and other statements (see Salmond, 2011a, b), ‘the economy’ is 
mobilised as a neutral means to realise the greater symbolic end of a shared 
National Interest. Just months before economic crisis overwhelmed neoliberal 
Ireland, First Minister, Alex Salmond, argued that the Scottish state’s ‘one 
central Purpose’ was to transform ‘Scotland's comparative advantage in the 
global economy’ into ‘a Celtic Lion economy, matching, and then overtaking, 
the Irish Tiger’ (Scottish Government, 2007: v). Its unifying National Purpose 
envisaged ‘opportunities for all of Scotland to flourish, through increasing 
sustainable economic growth’ (Scottish Government, 2007: 1; 2011).  
The multiple strategic objectives, priorities, targets and national indicators 
underlying the National Purpose draw deeply on the infrastructural power of 
the devolved Scottish state. ‘Strategic Priorities’ were outlined to create what 
Bourdieu (2006) meant by forms of ‘capital’ - cultural, economic, social, 
political and symbolic: ‘Learning, Skills and Well-being’ contribute to cultural 
and educational capital; ‘Supportive Business Environment’ stimulates 
economic capital through fiscal, technical and intellectual support to attract 
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‘mobile factors of production’; ‘Infrastructure Development and Place’ 
generates the conditions for social capital through transport, communications 
and planning efficiencies; ‘Effective Government’ enhances political capital by 
demonstrating state competence and authority; and ‘Equity’ functions as 
symbolic capital for a national fraternity based on equal opportunities and 
more geographically even and greener development.  
 
Scotland as a Power Container 
In his critique of Marxist accounts of the state, Anthony Giddens (1981, 1985) 
developed the idea of the state as a ‘bordered power container’ to account for 
the historically complex relationship between class, state and capitalism. First, 
while capital and labour have conflicting interests they are also mutually 
dependent on each other and, second, the capitalist class do not personally 
populate the functionary positions of the state. While the state’s revenue is 
dependent upon the accumulation process it does not control this directly 
(1981: 212). The state concentrates power through technologies of 
surveillance and communications; it monopolises the use of internal and 
external violence; private capital, and with it class conflict, is formally divorced 
from political institutions; and ‘industrialism’ concentrates private means of 
production in particular locations (Giddens, 1985).  
 
At the heart of Giddens’ definition of the state as ‘power container’ is the 
exclusive capability for organised violence within the post-Westphalia inter-
state system. Here military-political states gradually transmogrified from an 
apparatus of war-making to an apparatus in defence of bounded populations. 
Clearly, the Scottish state does not possess the full panoply of sovereign 
powers: it cannot declare war or set up independent border controls. In the 
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devolved settlement, the organisation of military violence and border control 
rests with the UK state within the context of the European Union. Scotland 
might still be characterised as a ‘stateless nation’ since it lacks geopolitical 
power to assert the interests of its ruling groups, assuming that these could be 
disaggregated from British or transnational capital (McCrone, 1992).  
Nevertheless, the Scottish state does possess some core features of the 
power container in its distinctive legislative and criminal justice system (Croall 
et al, 2010). Scots law, for instance, is taken to reflect the compassionate 
values of the nation, illustrated by the controversial release of the convicted 
Lockerbie bomber, the Libyan national Abdelbaset Al-Megrahi, by the Scottish 
Justice Secretary Kenny MacAskill in August 2009. MacAskill used the powers 
available and defended his decision by appealing to the trans-class humanist 
values of ‘the Scottish people’: 
 
In Scotland, we are a people who pride ourselves on our humanity. It is 
viewed as a defining characteristic of Scotland and the Scottish people. 
The perpetration of an atrocity and outrage cannot and should not be a 
basis for losing sight of who we are, the values we seek to uphold, and 
the faith and beliefs by which we seek to live. (MacAskill, 2009) 
 
More broadly, devolution politicised the Scottish criminal justice system, 
challenging its welfarist assumptions as it converged more closely with the 
class biases of populist punitivism in England and Wales (Croall et al., 2010). 
Scotland’s growing prison population, one of the highest in Europe, shows a 
‘near absolute correlation’ between the rate of imprisonment and the worst 
areas of urban deprivation (Houchin, 2005). 
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Legal-juridical powers apart, the Scottish state is not a classic power 
container. Moreover, Giddens’ institutional separation of state and capital 
seems naïve in light of the market-constituting practices of the neoliberal 
state. Devolution possesses many of the features that Michael Mann (1984) 
characterised as ‘infrastructural power’. By this Mann means a much wider 
range of powers through which the state regulates social life by deploying 
communications, political participation, welfare rights and economic planning. 
Peter Taylor (1994) further developed the idea of the state as a power 
container to account for other functions of the state - as a ‘wealth container’, 
as a ‘cultural container’, and as a ‘social container’. Combined, the territorial 
shape of the state container is twisted in different directions to produce a 
‘triple territoriality’. As a power container the state attempts to preserve its 
territorial integrity; as a wealth container the state tries to extend its territorial 
reach within the world system; as a cultural container it restricts recognition to 
smaller territorial nations or regions.  
Conceiving the multiple spatio-temporal logics of the devolved state seems a 
useful point of departure for tracing different, inter-related sources of class 
reproduction. A devolved UK state in pursuit of neoliberal policies is subject to 
the storms and stresses of multiple and leaky territoriality. Contrary to 
Giddens’ false opposition of the bounded state and the borderless economy, 
the UK state has always been a ‘leaky container’ (Taylor, 1994). It shed some 
institutional power externally to the world-system and ceded other powers to 
internal nationalist movements. As the central state becomes more porous, 
devolution does not mean the loss of state capabilities as such but their 
territorial redistribution and recombination in different magnitudes. However, 
Taylor (1994) tends to naturalise state power as a linear process, where the 
state first captures politics, then economics, followed by culture, finally 
absorbing society to become a fully-fledged nation-state.  
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Devolved Scotland is a leaky container. As a power container it encompasses 
controls over law, home affairs, and the police; second, as an economic 
container it exerts some control over agriculture, fisheries, planning, economic 
development, training, and tourism; third, as a social container it controls 
health, social work, housing, and local government; and fourth, as a cultural 
container it controls education, the arts and sport, and the natural and built 
environment (Scotland Office, 2009). Of course, these functions may pass 
between two or more containers, for example, education is not only about 
cultural transmission but also socialises subjects into economic values or civic 
behaviours. This requires us to examine the substantive class content of 
devolved state containers.  
 
Scotland as a Wealth Container 
Any conception of the devolved state as a ‘wealth container’ of economic 
capital has to address the relative degree of integration between capital and 
state. In the twentieth century the British state assumed overall responsibility 
for economic activity. This transformed the meaning of political economy from 
Adam Smith onwards (Meek, 1967). Wealth containers are caught in a never 
ending cycle of renewing the basis for their existence (Hobson, 1997). State 
infrastructural power depends on the extent of its reach into society to 
generate revenue through taxation, which depends on the size of GDP, which 
in turn depends on state spending on infrastructure, locational incentives, 
social policies, education, stable currency, and so on (Mann, 1984). Such 
multiple interdependencies make the wealth container among the most leaky 
of all state containers (Taylor, 1994). Economic activity flows across borders 
and global conditions limit the room for manoeuvre. Nevertheless, the UK 
 17 
state remains a significant wealth container. Although the Scottish state has 
scope for raising taxes and economic development it stands in a dependent 
relationship to the unitary UK state and its relationship to financial institutions 
in the City of London. This was demonstrated graphically by the bail out in 
2008-2009 of Scotland’s major clearing banks, RBS and HBOS. 
 
As a wealth container, inequalities are less pronounced between the nations 
of the UK than they are within them. Where absolute levels of paid 
employment are taken as an indicator of economic success, Scotland 
manages to score relatively well compared to other UK nations and regions. 
Only London has a higher level of full-time employment (NEP, 2010: 122-3). 
Clearly some groups do better than others. Median hourly wages of £10.84 for 
men and £8.78 for women in Scotland in 2006-8 are roughly comparable to 
England (£11.29 and £8.91 - but not London at £13.94 and £12.32) and are 
higher than Wales (£10.15 and £8.30) and Northern Ireland (£9.40 and £8.50) 
(NEP, 2010: 153). Moreover, the relative value of earnings is also higher, 
thanks mainly to lower property and rental values in Scotland than other UK 
regions, with the exception of Wales, Yorkshire and North East England. After 
housing costs are factored in, household income is more evenly spread 
across the UK but inequalities become more pronounced within regions, 
especially London (NEP, 2010: 203; Dorling et al. 2007).  
 
At the same time the capital-enabling devolved state is also market-
constituting. Where the relative value of income fails to keep up with the cost 
of culturally essential commodities personal and social needs are increasingly 
met through processes of financialisation, including historically high levels of 
personalised debt in Scotland (Law and Mooney, 2010). Traditionally, class-
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imposed sobriety and asceticism was inscribed in Scots law for debt recovery 
and enforcement. Until 2002 debt enforcement in Scotland relied on the public 
humiliation of poindings and warrant sales. Creditors need to be protected 
from default but in ways which do not call the foundations of the wider credit-
debt economy into question. In 2003 the Scottish Executive issued 
contradictory proposals to reduce the stigma of bankruptcy but at the same 
time ‘encourage responsible risk-taking’ (Scottish Executive, 2003).  
 
Higher levels of class deprivation in Scotland are often explained by higher 
public spending than England. Such levels of public sector ‘dependency’, it is 
argued, are perpetuated by a self-interested political bloc, creating national 
disincentives for entrepreneurial activity (Nelson, 2005). In an article titled 
‘Welcome to the People’s Republic of Scotland’, The Sunday Times 
commissioned a report from the Centre for Economics and Business 
Research (CEBR) to demonstrate that Scotland is entrenched in state 
dependency comparable to China, Cuba and Iraq (Allardyce and Bellgutay, 
2010). While claims about public sector ‘feather bedding’ are fiercely 
contested (see Cumbers and Birch, 2006), public sector workers in Scotland 
are seen by some as ‘a relatively privileged class of employees’ who enjoy 
higher average wages and pensions, better terms and conditions compared to 
private sector employees, and are protected by high trade union densities 
(McWhirter, 2010b). In 2009/10 labour cost around 52 per cent (£18.8 billion) 
of devolved spending (Audit Scotland, 2009: 13). Of 620,000 public sector 
jobs (somewhere between 24-26 per cent of all employees in Scotland) 83 
percent relate to devolved bodies and 17 percent to reserved bodies (National 
Statistics Scotland, 2010). Such figures conceal the uneven public sector 
penetration in urban areas like Dundee, where it accounts for 40 percent of all 
employment, leaving it highly vulnerable to cuts in public finances (Dundee 
Economic Profile, 2010).  
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Growing disparities in earnings are apparent within public administration, 
education and health, the latter two sectors, with high concentrations of 
female labour, fare worse across the bottom deciles than average earnings in 
Scotland as a whole (Table 4). Higher qualifications needed for public 
administration, health and education helps explain increased earnings for 
higher deciles. In a study by the Scottish Government’s advisor on public 
sector pay, David Bell (2010) found that public sector workers in Scotland are 
paid less on average than the UK overall (see Table 5). Public sector workers 
with a higher degree earn 7 percent more than private sector workers in 
Scotland but 5 percent less than the UK public sector overall. Public sector 
pay compares favourably to the private sector in Scotland because of lower 
levels of investment by private capital in the Scottish economy, particularly in 
higher-skill, upper knowledge labour.  
Insert Table 4 
Insert Table 5 
A consensus exists across the political spectrum for greater fiscal autonomy 
for the Scottish state. In 2006 the Liberal Democrat-sponsored Steel 
Commission proposed a system of ‘fiscal federalism’ (Steel, 2006). In 2009 
the Calman Report argued for a system of fiscal devolution based on equity, 
implying no fiscal disadvantage to Scotland, autonomy to raise taxes, political 
accountability and public transparency (Commission on Scottish Devolution, 
2009). At the same time, the SNP government reflected ‘the growing 
consensus’ with what they called a ‘National Conversation’ for full fiscal 
autonomy as a prelude to political independence from the UK state (The 
Scottish Government, 2009a). In June 2010 business interests and academics 
formed the Campaign For Fiscal Responsibility to end Scotland’s ‘dependency 
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culture’ and ease institutional tensions in the UK by making the devolved state 
responsible for raising all taxation (Hughes-Hallet and Scott, 2010).  
 
Claims and counter-claims about Scotland as a ‘subsidy junkie’ have 
persisted since the 1980s (Rosie, 2000). Despite large concentrations of 
urban deprivation and responsibility for the administration of one third of the 
UK land mass, competitive nationalists claim that ‘Scotland’ is a net 
contributor to the UK state based principally on oil and gas revenues and, 
before 2008, the ‘financial success of companies such as the Royal Bank of 
Scotland’ (Leask and Fraser, 2007). In their State of the Nation 2010 report 
the CEBR (2010) concluded that high public spending in Scotland has been 
financed largely by stronger market economies of south east England, 
particularly London. This is complicated by the CEBR’s own evidence that the 
share of GDP represented by public spending increased since devolution by a 
greater amount in London (16%) than Scotland (11.6%), even with added 
costs of creating a new system of government. Official public expenditure 
statistics reveal that public spending per head of population is broadly similar 
across London and Scotland (Table 6).   
Table 6 
Such arguments revisit the old canard that public spending ‘crowds out’ the 
entrepreneurial spirit in Scotland (Bacon and Eltis, 1976; Mooney, Morelli and 
Seaman, 2009: 102-103). Even some mainstream commentators in Scotland 
accept that a large public sector inhibits the energetic efficiency of private 
capital. As the journalist Iain McWhirter (2010a) put it: ‘An economic cold bath 
could perhaps shock Scotland out of its post-industrial torpor and boost 
private investment which many economists believe is being “crowded out” by 
the state’. Here the Scottish state is seen as more of a ‘wealth constrainer’ 
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than a wealth container. Yet, this voids the extent to which the Scottish state 
functions as a neoliberal enabling state, attempting to ‘crowd in’ marketed 
wealth, assisting, nurturing and promoting private capital in every conceivable 
way, from labour supply to roads to buildings to contracts to subsidies to 
education to enterprise agencies, in keeping with the Scottish government’s 
‘one central Purpose’ of territorial wealth containment. 
 
Scotland as a Cultural Container 
While the Scottish state has little geopolitical authority as a power container 
and limited economic autonomy as an integrated state-capital wealth 
container, this is compensated by a surplus of collective sentiment as a 
cultural container. It is the state’s duty to express or constitute the collective 
will through cultural, social and educational policies, and so preserve the 
apparently spontaneous autonomy of civil society (Paterson, 1994). Much 
store is invested in educational capital in Scotland as a means to equalise 
class inequalities. For more than a century educational access and 
qualification achievements have been celebrated as central components of 
Scotland as a meritocratic nation. Education is widely seen as one of the 
distinctive egalitarian national institutions of Scottish civil society, alongside 
law and religion, yet it reflects, reinforces and deepens class entrenchment in 
Scotland.  
 
Two facets of educational policy are particularly important for equalising initial 
class inequalities in Scotland: a more inclusive public comprehensive system 
and higher participation rates than elsewhere in the UK (Iannelli, 2007). 
Despite this, class inequalities in educational outcomes are persistently higher 
than in England and Wales. A wider gulf exists within Scotland for Secondary 
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4 level results between the most deprived and the least deprived 
neighbourhoods (a difference of 49 points) than for comparable results in 
England (35 points) (NEP, 2010: 93-5). In the 1990s children from the ‘service 
class’ in Scotland entered higher education in much greater proportions than 
their counterparts in England. As higher education expanded, middle class 
groups in Scotland were strategically positioned to colonise it faster and more 
deeply. In the most affluent neighbourhood decile in Scotland even more 
people (38 per cent) attained degree qualifications than in England (29 
percent) (NEP, 2010: 108-9). 
 
It is well understood that higher education valorises the arbitrary practices and 
values of middle class habitus (Bourdieu, 2006). Education reflects a class-
specific habitus where working class speech is internalised as inferior and 
marginalised by a Scottish education system that consecrates standard 
English in a predominately middle class academic environment (Tett, 2000). 
An additional factor behind middle class entrenchment is the way that the 
employment and educational fields intersect in Scotland. Affluent households 
in Scotland over-invest in educational attainment because of the higher 
proportion of credentialed employment opportunities in middle class, public 
sector labour markets compared to the greater opportunities for less-qualified 
private sector employment in England (Iannelli, 2007). Yet middle class labour 
markets do not exist in an undifferentiated way: both public and private 
service sector employment is increasingly fragmented but also polarised, 
experiencing work intensification and growing precarity in much of what once 
was regarded as secure and rewarding ‘middle class’ employment (see 
Mooney and Law, 2007).  
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Scotland as a Social Container  
As a ‘social container’ the state underwrites the social morphology of class 
reproduction. Through the appeal of citizenship the social container generates 
social capital in cohesive and useful populations to meet the economic and 
military requirements of the wealth and power containers. ‘Sustainable 
communities’ is one of the Scottish government’s five strategic objectives. Yet 
according to Scottish Household Survey findings, enduring communities 
already exist throughout Scotland (Scottish Government, 2009b). Most 
people, around 90 percent, consistently hold that their neighbourhoods are 
generally good or very good places to live (ibid: 21). Not surprisingly, the most 
deprived neighbourhood deciles are significantly less likely to perceive their 
neighbourhoods as pleasant, safe, friendly, or community-spirited and more 
likely to experience vandalism, difficult neighbours, and drug misuse or 
dealing. They also have less access to greenspaces and parks, and are less 
likely to own or have access to a car. Poorer sections of the working class find 
that their social networks are confined to their immediate locality.  
 
To address the social capital deficit the Scottish Government aims to develop 
personal skills and confidence through voluntary activity. Only around one in 
five households earning under £15,000 volunteered in 2008 for some unpaid 
role whereas almost half of those earning more than £40,000 claimed to have 
done so (ibid: 150; see also Danson, 2010). The Scottish government also 
seeks to attract international graduate labour (‘Fresh Talent’) to Scotland to 
compensate for national population decline and generate high skill labour 
supply for ‘the knowledge economy’ (Scottish Executive, 2004). Nevertheless, 
the largest group of migrants typically arrive via the long established two-way 
employment routes between Scotland and England. Surveys show that a 
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large proportion of English migrants are professionals and managers (Findlay, 
et al, 2004). Here the imbrication of class and nation is perceived as 
pervasive. Geographically mobile professionals reject the fixity of traditional 
social categories of national ‘historical tribes’ and employ more fluid, 
contingent identities. This releases them from becoming absorbed by Scottish 
identity. National duality – British or Scottish - is therefore strongly imprinted 
by class affiliation. Senior managers and professionals tend to emphasise 
Britishness, perhaps reflecting their greater geographical mobility and 
proximity to national centres of decision-making elites. A strong British identity 
corresponds to a middle class habitus of career prospects, collegiality and 
intrinsically worthwhile employment (Christie et al, 2005: 255). In contrast, 
people who forefront Scottish identity tend to share a working class habitus 
that sees paid work in instrumental terms of labouring for life’s necessities and 
distractions.  
 
Behind such policy interventions lies a Scottish variant of the ‘white working 
class’ discourse. Here a bastion of unenlightened lower class prejudice 
circulates against outsiders and operates as a significant barrier to 
competitive nationalism (Haylett, 2001). In Scotland, a negative, collectivist 
working class are deemed to lack appropriate social and cultural capital and 
fail to develop necessary tolerant and aspirational values, expressed in the 
so-called Scots’ ‘crisis of confidence’ (Craig, 2003, 2010; Ferguson, 2010). 
Another expression of subaltern intransigence is a negative attitude to cultural 
markers like speaking with what is considered an upper class accent. One 
study into students at the University of Edinburgh attributes anti-Englishness 
in the city to a lack of cosmopolitan mobility, aspiration and cultural 
intolerance among a recalcitrant working class culture (Bond, et al, 2010). 
Negative perceptions may repel highly qualified migrants from settling in 
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Scotland and suggests a need for class correctional policies. As the 
Edinburgh researchers advised the Scottish Government: ‘This highlights the 
need for Scotland’s political classes to further address [working class] 
attitudes to migrants and minorities if they are to meet their demographic 
objectives by attracting and retaining talented people’ (Bond, et al, 2010: 496).  
 
‘Scotland’s political classes’, upon whom responsibility for social containment 
falls, form a compact, self-legitimating network, consisting of a relatively small 
number of people, clustered in the central region with its nodal point in 
Edinburgh (Moore and Booth, 1989; Keating 2010). With devolution, 
associational networks became an even more valuable currency as social 
capital and political capital were more readily converted into the economic 
capital of market advantage through access to and contact with business 
insiders (Miller, 2010). Charges of ‘McCronyism’ followed lobbying scandals in 
the early years of the Labour-dominated Scottish Parliament involving family 
relatives and friends, PR companies and Labour politicians (Schlesinger, et al, 
2001). Organised around the Parliament, which business interests in Scotland 
had largely opposed, elite networks created an incestuous personal and 
professional blurring of roles between business, lobbyists, advisors and 
politicians (Raco, 2003). Academic insiders are also embedded in policy 
networks since Scotland is said to have ‘the right scale, social capital and 
communities of trust required for effective knowledge exchange and research 
use’ (Jung et al, 2010: 214). However, ‘evidence-based policy’ rarely 
challenges the ‘what counts is what works’ principle of the capital-enabling 
state. Policy researchers too often focus on problems of policy implementation 
not the neoliberal context and share assumptions about the competitive 
nation. One illustration of this is academic support for the Government’s Early 
Years Framework, established in 2008 to inter alia develop ‘common values in 
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the workforce, enhancing workforce skills and developing broader workforce 
roles’ (ibid: 225). 
 
Conclusion 
In such ways the active infrastructural power of the Scottish state attempts to 
naturalise competitive nationalism and nationalise class divisions. That the 
Scottish state is a leaky container does not lessen the power, social, cultural, 
economic and symbolic, of dominant groups. Overall, the spatial effect of 
class reproduction under a neoliberal polity is to expand the territorial reach of 
the devolved state, even if it falls short of complete independence. As a legal-
juridical power container with considerable infrastructural reach, the devolved 
state accentuates its territorial integrity, despite converging with wider criminal 
justice regimes of UK punitivism.  
 
As a wealth container, an emerging consensus exists for greater fiscal 
autonomy. This not only re-calibrates the territorial politics of revenue 
distribution between the UK and Scotland, it also aims to extend the Scottish 
state’s capacity to crowd-in global capital beyond its existing capital-enabling 
functions. As a cultural container, Scotland’s educational system reproduces 
class positions even as it consecrates territorially-specific educational 
traditions. As a social container, dense policy networks exercise territorial 
capture and seek to mobilise infrastructural power to secure national solidarity 
among the population through inclusionary interventions. In such ways, 
devolution entrenches enabling forms of dominant power through flexible, 
trusted inter-personal networks, blurring Giddens’ ideal separation of state 
and market power.  
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The impact of far reaching budget reductions as part of the UK government’s 
‘austerity’ measures, together with cuts implemented by the Scottish 
government will work to increase latent and manifest class and national 
tensions that are at the heart of the devolution project in Scotland. In this 
context, as we have seen, the SNP have since their re-election in May 2011 
mobilised a contradictory self-image of Scottishness in policy-making 
pronouncements. Realising this vision will mean overcoming growing 
opposition to cuts in public sector jobs and services. Envisioning devolved 
Scotland not as a consensual order where class has been made redundant by 
a common National Purpose but as field of social retrenchment fraught with 
tensions is therefore a crucial and necessary starting point for critical analysis 
of territorial politics and devolved statehood. 
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Table 1: Percentage votes in Scotland (number of seats), UK General 
Elections 1979-2010 
 1979 1983 1987 1992 1997 2001 2005 2010 
 




















































Table 2: Percentage constituency votes at Scottish Parliamentary 
elections, 1999-2011 
 1999 2003 2007 2011 
Labour (%) 
 
39 35 32 32 
Conservative (%) 16 17% 17 
 
14 




Table 3: Change in manufacturing employment change in Scotland and 
UK, 1974-84  
 1974-79 1979-84 1974-84 
Scotland -10.6 -27.6 -38.2 
UK -7.6 -23.8 -31.4 
Source: Adapted from Massey, 1988: 56. 
 36 
Table 5: Gross weekly earnings (£) in Scotland and UK, public and 
private sectors by qualification. 
   UK  Scotland  
   Private  Public  Ratio  Private  Public  Ratio  
Higher Degree  772  650  0.84  580  618  1.07  
First Degree  640  539  0.84  509  513  1.01  
HNC/HND Equivalent  481  428  0.89  413  414  1.00  
NVQ Level 3  375  355  0.95  336  342  1.02  
Trade Apprenticeship  429  384  0.90  416  372  0.90  
O Level or Equivalent  311  308  0.99  278  290  1.04  
Other Qualification  333  316  0.95  289  260  0.90  
No Qualification  263  235  0.89  249  236  0.95  
 
Source: Labour Force Survey 2005-2009, in Bell, 2010: 3. 
 
Table 6: Public spending per head (£), 2004-5 to 2008-9 (2008-9 prices) 
 2004-5 2005-6 2006-7 2007-8 2008-9 
London 8,495 8,818 8,868 9,089 9,464 
Scotland 8,354 8,886 9,013 9,238 9,412 
Source: PESA, 2010: Table 9.4 
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Figure 1: Division of Powers between the UK state and the Scottish 
Parliament 
Reserved Matters Devolved matters 
• The Constitution  
• Foreign affairs  
• Defence  
• International development  
• The Civil Service  
• Financial and economic 
matters  
• Immigration and nationality  
• Trade & Industry  
• Social security  
• Employment  
• Abortion, genetics, surrogacy, 
medicines  
• Broadcasting  
• Equal opportunities 
• Health  
• Education and training  
• Local government 
• Social work  
• Housing 
• Planning  
• Tourism, economic 
development  
• Roads and bus policy 
• Criminal and civil law 
• The police and fire services  
• The environment  
• Agriculture, forestry and fishing  
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20,704 24,347 28,666 33,710 42,835 
     
Source: adapted from Table 5.7a, Office of National Statistics, Annual Survey of Hours and Earnings 2009 (x = unreliable) 
 
